SAME-SEX UNIONS AND CONFLICTS OF LAW:
WHEN “I DO” MAY BE INTERPRETED AS “NO, YOU DIDN’T”!
Kathy T. Graham1
Introduction
For years, marriage was a union between a male and a female.2 No controversy
existed about the definition of marriage, and no one tried to change the definition to
include same-sex couples. Recently, however, in many states in the United States and in
many foreign countries, there has been substantial momentum to include same-sex
couples in the institution of marriage.3
In several countries this momentum has resulted in a change in the law. In the
Netherlands, in other Northern European countries, and in Vermont and Massachusetts in
the United States, the law has been changed either to include same-sex unions in
marriage or to provide an alternative law to give same-sex couples the same benefits as
marriage.4
In Canada, an Ontario court recently held that the definition of marriage that restricts
the union to a man and a woman violates the country’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Immediately after the ruling, the city of Toronto issued full marriage licenses to same-sex
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couples that applied.5 Then the Canadian Cabinet approved a policy to open marriage to
same-sex couples.
The definition of marriage is changing to give same-sex couples the protection
afforded by marriage laws to heterosexual couples. Whether that protection means
expansion of the definition of marriage or affording the same-sex couple the same
protection but through a different means varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some
cases, the change may be occurring through incremental changes in the law to allow
same-sex couples insurance benefits, death benefits and other kinds of protection
normally reserved to spouses.6 The jurisdiction may be providing the benefits of
marriage but without giving official approval to the relationship.
Given the variation in the approaches taken for this change, conflicts in the law
are inevitable. For instance, if one state in the United States recognizes same-sex
marriage or a domestic partnership and another state does not, a conflict-of-laws arises
5
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when a couple whose union has been affirmed in one state moves to a state that does not
recognize same-sex unions. The same kind of conflict arises in situations where samesex couples travel from countries that recognize such unions to countries that do not. For
example, a couple who marries in the Netherlands and travels to the United States or to
another European country may ask a court to affirm the same-sex union to provide one or
both of the partners the benefit of the law. How that conflict is resolved in either Europe
or the United States is a significant question.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the conflicts issues raised by the
differences in law regarding recognition of same- sex unions. Part I of the paper describes
the different ways that the law has developed. Part II considers the conflicts issues that
arise in the United States. It considers the nature of the conflict and how it is likely to be
resolved, and it includes discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense
of Marriage Act, federal laws that impact the conflicts issue.7 Section III describes the
international conflicts. The section examines these conflicts from the perspective of a
European state as well as an American state and focuses primarily on Europe and the
United States. Part IV offers a conclusion about the issues presented.

Part I: History of the Development of Laws Recognizing Same-sex Relationships
There are three different approaches that jurisdictions have taken to providing
legal protection for same-sex couples. One approach is to redefine marriage to include
same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples. A second approach is to provide a
parallel partnership track to same-sex couples that offers the same kind of benefits as
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marriage, but does not put the parties in the same position as they would be had they
married. The final approach is to adopt incremental legal changes that afford the samesex couple some of the economic and other benefits of marriage but do not fully sanction
the relationship.

A. Recognition of same-sex relationship as marriage
The Netherlands is the first country to give same-sex partners the right to marry. The
Dutch Parliament enacted a statute that gives same-sex couples protection equivalent to
heterosexual couples.8 It earlier had accorded same-sex couples registration and
partnership rights similar to those available in a number of states and countries today.
Then, in deciding to move from the partnership model to the marriage model, it
decided, “same-sex couples can only be afforded equal treatment if they are allowed to
enter into civil marriages.”9 The bill that eventually became law amends Article 30,
Book 1 of the Netherlands Civil Code to read as follows:
1. A marriage can be contracted by two persons of different sex or of the same sex.
2. The law only considers marriage in its civil relations.10
Two problems concerned the Parliamentary committee that recommended this sea
change. One concerned the presumption of parentage of children born during marriage
and whether or not that presumption should apply to same-sex couples. The legislation
does not include that presumption for same-sex couples. The other issue concerned the
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international recognition of Dutch marriages in other countries. Parliament limited
marriage to Dutch citizens.11 Belgium became the second country to legalize same-sex
marriage, but unlike the Netherlands, it does not allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt
children.12
Recently, in Canada, the Ontario Appeal Court issued a decision that declares
prohibitions against homosexual marriage unconstitutional.13 In making its decision, the
court ruled that the “existing common law definition of marriage violates equality rights
on the basis of sexual orientation under the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of
the Canadian Constitution.”14 A court in British Columbia has ordered the federal
Parliament to revise the definition of marriage by July 2004 or the court will change the
definition to include same-sex couples.15 Recent newspaper reports indicate that the
government has decided not to appeal the case and will instead draft and send to
Parliament the necessary legislation to modify the marriage laws to include same-sex
unions.
Several states in the United States have considered the question of the
constitutionality of restricting marriage to heterosexual unions. Courts in Hawaii and
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Alaska held that the restriction of marriage to heterosexual unions is unconstitutional, but
subsequent state constitutional amendments made the decisions moot.16
A state superior court decision in Massachusetts held that the right to marry is one
that is deeply rooted in our history and tradition. It may be restricted to heterosexual
marriage as it has been throughout our history. There is no constitutional requirement to
include homosexual marriage within the tradition of marriage.17 The court says the
appropriate means of redress is through the Legislature, not through the courts.18
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down the lower court decision.19
In holding that the marriage laws violate the Massachusetts State Constitution, the Court
stated:
We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts law. We declare that barring
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution. We vacate the summary judgment for the
Department. We remand this case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion. Entry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to
permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of
this opinion.20
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In a recent addition to the opinion as requested by the state Legislature, the court clarified
its previous decision and stated that the new law must give same-sex couples the right to
marry, not an equivalent right to enter into a civil union, as the Legislature in Vermont
created for its same-sex couples.21

B. Recognition of Same-Sex Relationship as a Partnership
A number of jurisdictions, both foreign and one within the United States, opted to
create a partnership track parallel to marriage that offers the same-sex couple much, if not
all, the protection available to a married couple.
Several Northern European countries, including Norway, Sweden, Finland and
Denmark have provided protection to same-sex couples for a number of years.22
Generally, the same-sex partnerships have the same rights and responsibilities accorded
to married partners. There are some restrictions, including qualifying for adoption and
for registration of a partnership.23 The option is generally available only to those who are
residents in the country.24 There is typically a reciprocal recognition provision that
provides for recognition of the partnerships in other Northern European countries.25
Traditionally, in the United States the regulation of marriage and family is a matter
that has been left to the states. The U.S. Constitution and the protection it accords to its
citizens restrict the states in their regulation.26 But the states decide what the
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requirements for marriage, for divorce, for adoption, and for other family matters should
be, including decisions about the regulation of same-sex unions.
In the United States, Vermont adopted our nation’s first civil union law that extends
to same-sex couples virtually all of the rights and responsibilities of marriage. In Baker
v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court held it a violation of the Common Benefits Clause
in its state constitution not to accord same-sex couples the same kind of protection
accorded to heterosexual couples through the marriage law.27 The court admonished the
Legislature to make these benefits and responsibilities available to same-sex couples.
The Legislature responded by enacting the Civil Union Law. In this law, the manner of
recognition and the benefits conferred are the same as for marriage.28 The law provides
for a civil or religious ceremony to create the union and also provides that the procedure
for dissolution of the union is identical to the procedure for marriage.29 In all other
respects, the union is like a marriage in that the partners have rights to support, have
rights to inherit from the other spouse and may not be married or in another civil union
while a part of this civil union.30 The law also makes it clear that a couple may travel
from another jurisdiction and celebrate a civil union ceremony in Vermont.31
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C. Partial recognition of rights for same-sex couples
Many other jurisdictions in the United States as well as in Europe offer more limited
protection to same-sex couples. Though the jurisdiction may not embrace the
relationship fully as it has in places like Vermont and the Netherlands, the law provides
some protection to same-sex couples.
For instance, Hawaii has enacted a reciprocal beneficiary system that provides certain
protections to same-sex couples.32 A number of other states and municipalities have
domestic partnership registries that grant same-sex couples benefits ranging from
symbolic recognition to economic rights.33 Additionally, a number of states have allowed
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gay and lesbian couples to adopt and to have some of the rights and responsibilities of
parents and of family despite the fact that they cannot marry.34 Before Governor Gray
Davis left office as California’s Governor, he signed a bill into law that takes effect on
January 1, 2005. This law expands the rights that Californians have under the Domestic
Partnership law to something more like the rights recognized in Vermont’s Civil Union
Law.35
The incremental approach, though not producing the full rights that same-sex couples
desire, nevertheless has produced some protection. Eventually, as these small changes
occur, over time, they may give way to general acceptance and recognition of same-sex
couples as entitled to the same rights as heterosexual couples. This appears to be the
direction that California has moved in its recent adoption of the California Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act.36

D. Significance of the Recognition of Same-Sex Unions
The significance of the recognition of the same-sex union is important for economic
as well as for status reasons.
When the Vermont court decided Baker v. State, it highlighted some of the benefits of
being married:
phenomenon leads to unpleasant results if one partner is injured outside of California: partners may not be
entitled to visitation privileges or have any input concerning health care options. (Citations omitted.)
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While the laws relating to marriage have undergone many changes during the last
century, largely toward the goal of equalizing the status of husbands and wives,
the benefits of marriage have not diminished in value. On the contrary, the
benefits and protections incident to a marriage license under Vermont law have
never been greater. They include, for example, the right to receive a portion of
the estate of a spouse who dies intestate and protection against disinheritance
through elective share provisions; preference in being appointed as the personal
representative of a spouse who dies intestate; the right to bring a lawsuit for the
wrongful death of a spouse; the right to bring an action for loss of consortium; the
right to workers’ compensation survivor; the right to spousal benefits statutorily
guaranteed to public employees, including health, life, disability, and accident
insurance; the opportunity to be covered as a spouse under group life insurance
policies issued to an employee; the opportunity to be covered as the insured’s
spouse under an individual health insurance policy; the right to claim an
evidentiary privilege for marital communications; homestead rights and
protections; the presumption of joint ownership of property and the concomitant
right of survivorship; hospital visitation and other rights incident to the medical
treatment of a family member; and the right to receive, and the obligation to
provide spousal support, maintenance, and property division in the event of
separation or divorce…37
Other benefits could be added to this list. Suffice it to say that the economic benefits of
marriage are many. None of these benefits are available to same-sex couples unless the
law is changed to include these couples within the ambit of the law’s protection.
Vermont’s Civil Union Law provides the broadest kind of protection to the same- sex
couple, giving the couple the full economic protection of marriage through the Civil
Union Law.
Although many of the benefits of marriage gained by the partners in the Vermont
decision are economic, non-economic benefits also become available including the
spousal evidentiary privilege and hospital visitation privileges.38 Rights related to the
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couple’s children also may be affected by the new law.39 Entering into a civil union in
Vermont also affects the ability of a partner to enter into other civil unions or marriages;
the law restricts the ability of a partner to have more than one partnership or marriage
relationship at the same time.40
In Vermont same-sex couples are entitled to the entire bundle of rights and
responsibilities included in a package equivalent to marriage. Perhaps same-sex couples
are content with laws that make the bundle of rights and responsibilities available to them
without giving them the status of marriage. In fact, for some, acquiring the rights in a
structure outside of marriage is preferable.41
What is missing in the Vermont civil union law is recognition of same- sex couples as
being married. Their status, although equivalent to marriage in terms of economic rights
and other marital rights, is not the same as marriage. It is called something different and
does not have the same status as marriage. The incremental impact of the lists of rights

17 VSA § 2532…(22) family landowner rights to fish and hunt under 10 VSA § 4253…(24) affirmance of
relationship under 15 VSA § 7.
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bestowed on the partners does not bestow on them the status of marriage. For instance,
in Rosengarten v. Downes, the court made it clear that the family court had no subject
matter jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex union precisely because the court did not
regard the union as a marriage.42
While the court said that the policy in Connecticut does not favor recognition of
same-sex marriage or same-sex unions, it pointed to other legislation that allows samesex couple adoptions along with other rights.43 This is consistent with the law in most
states in the United States as well as in European countries, which have recognized some
rights for same-sex couples equivalent to the rights of heterosexual couples. These rights
have been acquired through incremental changes in the law and do not provide equivalent
status or equivalent rights to marriage. The exceptions are the changes that have
occurred in such places as Canada and Vermont. But even Vermont has not provided its
same-sex couples with marriage.
On the other hand, the decision recently handed down in Massachusetts may offer
greater protection to same-sex couples. The court, in holding that the marriage statute
violates state constitutional rights of same-sex couples who wish to marry, states: “(W)e
construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others. This reformulation redresses the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury
and furthers the aim of marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships.”44
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Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn App 372, 378, 802 A2d 170, 175 (
). The court states that the
issue regarding jurisdiction of a civil union did not raise issues of marriage because “this civil union is not a
marriage” as defined in Connecticut or in Vermont. On the basis of that, the court found that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dissolution of the relationship.
43
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In reaching this holding, the court considered the goals that the state presented in
three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying: 1) providing
a good setting for procreation; 2) ensuring a good setting for child rearing; 3) preserving
scarce State and private financial resources. And the court rejects in turn all of these
justifications for drawing the distinction between same-sex partnerships and heterosexual
partnerships.45 In the end, the Court may be paving the way for same-sex partnerships to
marry in the same way that heterosexual couples marry. The court gives the Legislature
180 days to “take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion.” If the
Legislature does not, then the impact of this decision takes effect to hold that same-sex
partners have rights to be recognized under the state marriage laws. The Vermont
decision did not go quite so far, although it left open the possibility of having the
petitioners come back to court if the Legislature was unable to remedy the problem that
made the marriage laws constitutionally defective. Although it is possible that the
Legislature in Massachusetts will create the same remedy as the Vermont Legislature
created, it is possible that the marriage statute will be amended to include same-sex
couples as qualified for marriage.
In many respects, the difference in the two approaches may seem more academic than
practical. However, part of the reason for seeking to marry includes not only the legal
rights of marriage, but also the recognition of those rights in the form of the status of
marriage. The Massachusetts remedy has the potential for providing a broader protection
for same-sex unions than the Vermont decision did, although the Legislature in
Massachusetts may fashion a remedy that is similar to the Civil Union Law enacted in
Vermont.
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Part II: Interstate Conflict-of-Law Issues
Given the different positions the states have taken on recognition of same-sex unions,
conflict-of-law issues between the states will inevitably arise. Given the economic and
other issues at stake, it is apparent why the issues are so important to same-sex couples.
Given that Canada and two countries in Europe have legalized same-sex marriage,
and given that Massachusetts has declared that its marriage law violates the constitutional
rights of same-sex couples, it is likely that at some point, a state court will be called upon
to recognize the marriage union of a same-sex couple. Conflicts between states’ marriage
laws and between state and foreign countries’ marriage laws are undoubtedly going to
arise.
Since Vermont adopted the Civil Union Law, sister courts have already been called
upon to accept the status of a partner joined by a civil union in Vermont.
The following highlights some of the issues courts will have to consider in deciding
the cases:
Conflicts in laws may arise when a couple who lives in a state that does not recognize
same-sex unions goes to a state that does to marry or to create a civil union or obtain
other protection offered by that state. For instance, a couple domiciled in New York may
travel to Vermont to register their relationship as a civil union. They may then return to
New York and at some point ask a New York court to recognize the legality of their
relationship created pursuant to Vermont law. Or the couple may be domiciled in the
state that offers the protection but may leave that state and move to another state that does
not recognize same-sex unions or does not recognize the protection available in the state

where the couple had lived. A couple domiciled in Vermont and registered in Vermont
as a civil union under the Civil Union Law may move to Arizona and live in Arizona for
a number of years. At some point while they are domiciled in Arizona, they may ask a
court in Arizona to recognize their union.
The conflict may arise in different factual circumstances. For instance, a couple that
entered into a Civil Union may desire to divorce in a different jurisdiction. The couple
may ask the court to take jurisdiction of the matter as it would a divorce of a heterosexual
couple. Or, a partner may ask a court to provide the protection at a partner’s death. For
instance, if a couple had entered into a Civil Union pursuant to the option provided in
Vermont law, and one of the partners had died, the other member of the couple might
want to pursue a wrongful death action or some other kind of tort action.

A. Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act
The issue of recognition of a same-sex marriage in a sister state brings the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act into play. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act provide guidance to the states on how a
sister state is to treat another state’s law or judgment. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
provides: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.”46 The Clause has been interpreted to
require that sister states give recognition to judgments entered in other states. If, for
example, a state court in a state that has legalized same-sex marriage has entered a
judgment to dissolve the marriage, according to the Clause, a sister state’s court is
obligated to enforce the judgment in its court. On the other hand, the sister court may not
46

See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.

be obligated to recognize the law of the state that legalized same-sex marriage if a party
initiates the divorce proceeding in her court. In that divorce proceeding, the court might
apply its own law.47
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) adds another layer of federal law to be
considered. When Congress enacted DOMA, it interpreted the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to mean that states are not obligated to give effect to acts or records of judicial
proceedings of another state that treat relationships between persons of the same sex as
marriage.48 DOMA is a specific provision that excuses states from giving full faith and
credit to sister state laws and judgments that treat same-sex relationships as equivalent to
marriage.
Under DOMA, a state court could refuse to enforce either the law or the judgment of
the sister court.49 To the extent that DOMA is construed in a way that gives state courts
the option of not enforcing sister-state money judgments, the law is an exception to the
generally held principles of Full Faith and Credit that the sister-state courts have
traditionally followed and may be unconstitutional.50 To the extent that the DOMA
47

Borchers, Patrick, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of NonTraditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L.REV. 147, 164 (1998). The author states: As things stand now,
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1999) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998) that provides: No State, territory, or possession of the
United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
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See Borchers, supra, note 24 at 180-182.
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Borchers, supra note 24, at 182-183.

instructs a sister court that it is not obligated to follow the law of another state, DOMA is
not a departure from generally held views about recognition of state law by a sister state.
These issues have been covered in great detail in many other articles and will not be
considered at great length.51 Discussion in recent case law and academic writing raises
questions about the constitutionality of DOMA.52

B. State Statutes Prohibiting Recognition of Same-sex Unions
Many states have enacted state laws that prohibit recognition of same-sex unions
whether contracted in the state or outside. Some states have accomplished this by
clarifying the concept of marriage, making it clear that marriage is a union of a male and
a female.53 Other states have enacted statutes stating that same-sex marriages recognized
by another state or another country will not be recognized in that state.54 Still other states
have enacted statutes that include express prohibition of same-sex marriages, making it
clear that the public policy of the state is to retain the heterosexual model of marriage as
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For further discussion of the constitutionality of DOMA, see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict
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Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of N.Y., 2003 WL 21294889 (N.Y Sup.) The court says: “It is unclear
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restricts marriage to a male and a female. See Michael T. Morley et al, Developments in Law and Policy:
Emerging Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE LAW & POL. REV. 169, 188 (2003)
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Id. at 189. The author points out several states that have adopted this approach including Alaska, Idaho,
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the only one acceptable.55 And some states have created a hybrid statute that combines
the policies of the above statutes.56
To the extent that these statutes define the concept of marriage in the state, it seems
clear that the state legislature has the authority to define the concept of marriage within
the state.57 Of course, one might make the argument that the restriction in a marriage
statute violates federal constitutional law; if it does, the law will be struck down.58 But
otherwise, a state has authority to regulate marriage as it sees fit.
To the extent that these statutes attempt to regulate marriages entered into out of the
state, the statutes are like mini-DOMA laws that express a state policy against recognition
of out-of-state marriages between same-sex partners.59 The statutes may be interpreted to
mean that citizens domiciled in the state who marry outside the state will not have samesex marriages recognized in the state. Or the statute may mean that no out-of-state
marriages, whether entered into by state domiciliaries or others will be recognized instate. To the extent that the statute makes it clear that the enforcement of an out-of-state
judgment is not appropriate, a state should not enforce the other state’s judgment
regarding a same-sex marriage.
The Alaska statute provides that, “A marriage entered into by persons of the same
sex, either under common law or under statute, that is recognized by another state or
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between a man and woman, or male and female.” P. 259. See also David Orgon Coolidge, William C.
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foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage, including its termination, are unenforceable in this state.”60 The terms of the
statute indicate that the state does not sanction same-sex marriages, either in-state or outof-state. The statute applies to those who are domiciled in the state who go outside the
state to marry and also appears to apply to those who may seek recognition of an out-ofstate union in Alaska. The language states that the contract rights are unenforceable in
the state. To the extent that one regards the terms of the money judgment for support as a
contract right emanating from the marriage, the statute suggests that enforcement of a
judgment based on contract rights would also be unenforceable in Alaska. Whether or
not a statute that limits the rights of parties who legally married in a different jurisdiction
from recognition of those rights in the home jurisdiction may involve constitutional
questions.61 A statute that restricts the enforceability of an out-of-state judgment in its
state courts does involve issues of constitutional proportion.62
Whether a civil union is included in the prohibition of a state statute that prohibits
same-sex marriage depends upon the specific language of the statute and how a court
construes the statute. For instance, the Alaska statute that states that, “A marriage
entered into by persons of the same sex, …that is recognized by another state or foreign
jurisdiction is void in this state….” The statute goes on to state, “A same-sex relationship
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may not be recognized by the state as being entitled to the benefits of marriage.”63 The
language makes if fairly obvious that the prohibition relates to relationships other than
marriage. California’s new Domestic Partner Act does not purport to create marriage
rights for same-sex partners, but does give same-sex partners many of the same rights
that married partners enjoy in California. The Act further provides that domestic
partnerships formed in other states will be recognized as valid in California.64 This
approach is the opposite of the states that make it clear that out-of-state unions will not be
recognized.
The statutes enacted by the states raise constitutional issues about the authority that a
state has to determine the effect of an out-of-state law or an out-of-state judgment. But
most importantly, the statutes also raise conflict-of-law issues between the applicable law
of a sister state that allowed parties to enter into a same-sex union, while the law of
another sister state prohibits recognition of that very same union.

C. Conflict-of-Law Issues
Conflict-of-law issues arise when same-sex partners have married or created a union
in a jurisdiction that recognizes the relationship and then move or return to a jurisdiction
that does not recognize such a union. A state court may be called upon to recognize or
validate the relationship not authorized by the law in that state.
To resolve the conflict, one must first determine the basis for it. If local law allows
marriage and the other state does not, the conflict may be regarded as one between
63
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Section 299.2 of the Act provides: A legal union of two persons of the same sex, other than a marriage,
that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is substantially equivalent to a domestic
partnership as defined in this part, shall be recognized as a valid domestic partnership in this state
regardless of whether it bears the name domestic partnership.
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marriage statutes. Generally, marriages valid where performed are recognized in other
states.65 The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws provides that “A marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the State where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another
State which has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the
time of the marriage.”66 In determining which state has the most significant relationship,
Section 6 of the Restatement provides that the courts should follow any statutory
directives on the issue, “the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant
policies of the forum, the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, the protection of the
parties’ justified expectations, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and ease
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.”67
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 283 (1971). The reporter for the Second
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The formulation further makes clear that a marriage good under the law of the State of celebration
should not be overthrown unless this is required by the ‘strong public policy’ of the State of most
significant relationship.
…In making this determination, the forum should first inquire whether the courts of the State of
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time the action arose the parties had moved to a different State…(A) state will naturally have less
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away than it would if they have remained its local domiciliaries.
67
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If parties were married in a state that is also their domicile, it is very unlikely that a
court in another state will invalidate their marriage as the domiciliary state appropriately
applied its own law to the marriage All relevant policies point to recognition because no
other state has an interest in the validity of the marriage similar to the interest of the state
where parties are domiciled. Invalidating the marriage would happen only in rare cases
where the state has a very strong public policy against recognition.
More difficult conflict questions arise when the parties domiciled in a state that
prohibits the marriage travel to a state that allows the marriage, marry, and return to their
home state shortly after marrying. In Re May’s Estate68 considers the public policy
interests at stake when domiciliaries of the state travel to another state to marry in
violation of the local state’s marriage law. An uncle and niece married in Rhode Island
where their marriage was legal. They returned to New York and lived for 32 years before
the wife died, at which time their children questioned the validity of the marriage in a
probate proceeding. New York did not allow a marriage between an uncle and a niece.
The court concluded that “such marriage, solemnized, as it was, in accord with the ritual
of the Jewish faith in a State whose legislative body has declared such a marriage to be
‘good and valid in law,’ was not offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree
regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was not within the inhibitions of natural
law.”69

recognition of marriages contracted out of the forum state. Section 210 provides: “All Marriages
contracted within this state prior to January 1, 1975, or outside this state that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the
domicile of the parties are valid in this state.” On the other hand the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act limits
recognition of marriages contracted in another state when the parties left the state to avoid the marriage
laws of the domicile state. See, for example, VT.STAT.ANN tit.15, § 5 (1993).
68
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
69
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Many courts faced with similar issues regarding recognition of an out-of-state
marriage of a couple domiciled in the state have followed the reasoning of the court in In
Re May’s Estate when dealing with incest restrictions, age restrictions and restrictions on
remarriage following divorce.70
The reasons for a court’s willingness to validate a marriage that is in conflict with its
local law are illustrated in In Re May’s Estate. The parties were not questioning the
validity of their marriage. One of the parties died, and the children were seeking to have
the marriage declared void so that a daughter could be named as her mother’s
representative. If the court voids the marriage, it will not give effect to the intention of
the two parties to remain married. After the death of one of the parties, whether or not
the marriage violated local law becomes less important because the parties lived together
for 32 years and had four children. Given the policies mentioned by the Restatement, the
court chose protection of the parties’ justified expectations as an important value in
making its decision. The court also is mindful of the fact that state policy in New York is
less threatened by validating this marriage than Rhode Island law would be if the court
did not validate the marriage. Predictability and reliability of legal out-of-state marriages
is an important value.
If the court had been called upon to recognize the status of the parties as married
while they are married, perhaps it would have had more significant policy reasons for
invalidating the union. In that case, its court is being called upon to validate the status of
a relationship that the local law considers unlawful. But after one of the parties is
deceased, it seems less harmful to local state policies to recognize the union that the state
considers unlawful.
70
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Another way to view the legal conflicts issue created in a same-sex union case is as a
contract dispute. The Legislature in Vermont, in its Civil Union law, created a contractform different from marriage. The arrangement could be viewed as more a contract than
a marriage. If a dispute arises concerning a contract, the Restatement has a different rule
for determining applicable law. Where the parties have not provided for the choice of
law, the Restatement Second of Conflicts states that the “rights and duties of the parties
with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties under the principles stated in section 6.”71 (Section 6 refers to the general
principles and policies that should be taken into account in resolving conflicts.) If the
parties have provided for their resolution of this issue, that state law will govern their
contract rights.72
Parties entering into a civil union in Vermont obviously expect that the law of
Vermont will govern their relationship. If they live in Vermont, it is obvious that the
nexus of the relationship is in Vermont and no other state has as great an interest in the
71

RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONFLICTS, § 188. The section also provides: 2) In the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the
principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
a) The place of contracting,
b) The place of negotiation of the contract,
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e) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
3) If the pace of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of
this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
72
Id. at § 187. The section contains a caveat that (2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could
not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either (a) the
chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties’ choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.

contract and its terms. If parties from a different state travel to Vermont to enter into a
civil union, but then return to their home state, another state in addition to Vermont has
an interest in the contract. If the parties have not expressly designated Vermont law to
control their contract, it may be that the law of the other state will control because the
parties are domiciled in that other state. That other state, by virtue of being the domicile
of the parties, has a significant relationship to the contract. One might expect that the
issues about recognition of the contract will be resolved similarly to the way the marriage
cases are resolved. The longer the contract has been in effect, and depending on the
circumstances for the dispute, the more likely it is that a court would validate the contract
entered into by the parties.
Although Vermont and now Massachusetts are the only states that sanction same-sex
unions as equivalent to marriage, some states recognize and enforce cohabitation
contracts between unmarried partners.73 If one of the partners raised the validity of the
contract in another state, a conflicts issue is raised that would be solved by focusing on
the conflict in contracts law rather than marriage law. The focus of this article is on the
conflict issues in marriage law and does not deal with the contract conflicts issue. It is no
doubt important to keep in mind that a contract approach may be preferable in some cases
even though a contract analysis may not provide a party the benefits of marriage.
The following are several different hypothetical problems that create conflict-of-law
issues. How these conflicts would be resolved is discussed.
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See Carol S. Bruch, Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries a Decade After Marvin: Settled In or
Moving Ahead?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717 (1989). The article discusses the recognition gay couples
have received as unmarried cohabitants.

1. Conflict regarding dissolution of same-sex union
PROBLEM:
John and Joseph are residents of New York. When Vermont passed its Civil Union
Law, they immediately traveled to Vermont and registered as a civil union in
Vermont. They have lived together for several years and now are separated. John
has met someone new and would like to end the civil union. He would like to file for
dissolution in New York. Since neither of the parties to the union currently resides in
Vermont, it makes more sense to dissolve the union in New York. What will a New
York court do in this case? Will it take jurisdiction and dissolve the relationship?
Rosengarten v. Downes74 is a case very similar to the fact pattern presented above.
Plaintiff and defendant were joined in a civil union in Vermont. Plaintiff sought to have
the civil union dissolved as it had broken down irretrievably. Plaintiff had established
residency in Connecticut before filing the dissolution complaint. The court holds that it
is without jurisdiction to consider the dissolution because the court may only consider
“family relations matters,” and a civil union is not a family relations matter as set forth in
the statutes.75
In deciding that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court found that
the state public policy is against recognition of same-sex unions. In making this
determination, the court relied on the history of recent legislation allowing same-sex
partners to adopt and legislative history concerning the state’s decision not to adopt the
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Id. at 71 Conn.App. 379, 802 A.2d 175.

Defense of Marriage Act.76 The court uses the legislative history to show that the public
policy of Connecticut is not to recognize same-sex unions, but to follow a path different
from the one followed in Vermont. The court decided that a civil union is not a family
relations matter and therefore not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court
because the public policy of Connecticut is not supportive of recognition of same-sex
unions.
Another recent case from Georgia failed to give recognition to a same-sex union in
the context of a custody dispute. In Burns v. Burns77 the question before the court
concerned interpretation of a consent decree between two divorcing parties that restricted
visitation of children when the party being visited cohabited with any adult to whom the
party was not legally married.78 Mother Susan subsequently went to Vermont and
entered into a civil union with a female companion. When her former husband
complained that she violated the consent decree by cohabiting with her partner during
visitation with her children, she countered that the parties had been joined together in a
legally recognized union in Vermont and that she had not violated the terms of the
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In enacting the adoption law contained in General Statutes § 45a-727a the court said: “It becomes clear
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253 Ga.App 600, 560 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
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adult to which such party is not legally married or to whom party is not related within the second degree.”

decree. The court agreed with her husband because Georgia law defines marriage as a
relationship between a man and a woman and prohibits the recognition of same-sex
unions recognized in other states.79
Since the statutes make it clear that Georgia has public policy that opposes same-sex
marriage or recognition of the unions, the result is not at all surprising.
Another recent case recognizes the same-sex union entered into in Vermont by two
New York domiciliaries. In Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of New York,80 the parties
had entered into a Vermont civil union when shortly afterwards one of the partners, Neal
Spicehandler, was struck by a car and later died at the hospital. His partner, John Langan
sued for wrongful death. To qualify as a person who may sue under the wrongful death
statute, the person must qualify as a surviving spouse.81
Before the court defined the term spouse, it examined the conflicts rule for
recognition of out-of-state unions. New York recognizes out-of-state marriages if valid
where they are made unless the marriage is against the strong public policy of the state.
The court noted that common law marriages and other marriages that may not be created
in New York have been upheld in New York.82 The court goes on to look at its public
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policy and determines that its public policy “does not preclude recognition of a same-sex
union entered into in a sister state.”83 The court says:
Under principles of full faith and credit and comity, and following authority which
advances the concept that citizens ought to be able to move from one state to another
without concern for the validity or recognition of their marital status, New York will
recognize a marriage sanctioned and contracted in a sister state and there appears to
be no valid legal basis to distinguish one between a same-sex couple. And, unlike a
non ceremonial common law marriage contracted in a sister state which may be
dissolved at will, yet is recognized in New York, the Vermont civil union requires a
sanctioned civil ceremony, a license, and, significantly, a divorce to end the union.84
Once the court agrees that recognition of the relationship is compatible with the public
policy of New York, the court makes the logical move to construe spouse in the wrongful
death statute to include a same-sex marital partner. It recognizes that the term
undoubtedly did not mean same-sex partner when it was written, but the concept of
spouse has evolved over time and now does include same-sex partner.
Where the state has a statute that expressly declares same-sex marriage prohibited and
void in the state, it is difficult to argue that a same-sex union is compatible with state
public policy. On the other hand, where the jurisdiction has not enacted such a statute,
public policy may be more difficult to determine. In Connecticut, the court relied on
legislative history to point to policy that is not supportive of same-sex unions while New
York pointed to cases and other statutes that supported same-sex unions in its
jurisdiction.
When John and Joseph entered into a civil union in Vermont, they entered into a
union equivalent to marriage in all respects. Section 1206 of the Civil Union law
provides that, “The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedures and be
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subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution
of marriage….”85
In order for John to end the union, he is required to file for dissolution according to
the Vermont law. When John files for dissolution in a family court in New York to
dissolve his civil union, the first question faced by the court is whether it will recognize
the civil union. If the court is unwilling to recognize the union, it will certainly not
consider dissolving it.
A New York court is likely not obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
enforce the Vermont civil union law in New York. Restatement Second of Conflicts
states that if a marriage satisfies the requirements of the state where it was contracted, it
should be recognized as valid in other states unless it violates the strong public policy of
that other state which had the “most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage” when the parties married.86 Because both parties resided in New York when
they entered into the civil union and because John is asking a New York court to dissolve
the union, New York is the state that had the most significant relationship to the spouses
at the time of their marriage and also the most significant relationship to the spouses at
the time of their divorce.
Although it is not entirely clear that New York would use the Restatement Second
rationale for resolution of this conflicts issue, this analysis follows that approach.
To determine whether New York should invalidate the marriage, it must first look to
whether or not any state statutes would invalidate this out-of-state marriage of local
domiciliaries. New York has not enacted legislation as many states have that explicitly
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states that same-sex marriage will not be recognized within the state. If it had, the answer
would be clear that the statute states the policy and makes it clear that the marriage would
not be recognized.
New York’s conflicts law is consistent with recognition of out-of-state unions so
long as the marriage does not violate a strong public policy of the state.87 The conflicts
rule does not preclude recognition of this out-of-state union.
New York will then have to determine whether there is a sufficiently strong public
policy at stake to warrant invalidation of the rule. New York clearly does not have an
established state policy or state law that makes a same-sex union illegal. To the contrary,
recent cases and established law in New York suggest that the established policy may be
receptive to same-sex relationships.88 In a recent New York case the court concluded that
New York is receptive to same-sex relationships and pointed to laws providing same-sex
couples employment benefits, rent control protection, adoption rights, and most recently
protection for same-sex partners aggrieved by the tragic loss of life on September 11,
2001 in New York City.89 Given what this court had to say about the public policy of the
law in New York, it is very possible that a New York court would accept the validity of
the civil union and would consider the issues presented by a partner seeking dissolution
of the union.90
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If the court accepts the validity of a civil union, it agrees to accept the validity of a
civil union contracted in Vermont. It follows that it also accepts the status of the parties
as a couple bound by the laws of Vermont in a civil union. Although the court may
accept the validity of the civil union, it does not follow that the court will agree to accept
jurisdiction of its dissolution.
Whether the fact that the court is considering the dissolution of a civil union would
change the court’s view of application of local law is an issue to be considered. When
the parties entered into their civil union, they registered with the state and participated in
a proceeding not unlike a marriage ceremony.91 They intended to enter into a partnership
that provided them with the rights and responsibilities of marriage.92 They intended to
enter into a contract with one another and the state of Vermont that provided they would
need to divorce if they wished to end their relationship.93
Given that the parties entered into an agreement that they expected would be regarded
as a marriage and would require the same kind of dissolution process as a marriage, the
court in New York could apply its own dissolution law without frustrating the intent of
the parties. On the other hand, a court in New York might decide that the dissolution of a
civil union should be handled in Vermont since Vermont has enacted legislation to

and give effect to a civil union and thereby consider the dissolution of the union. Connecticut apparently
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provide for the dissolution of the unions and has created a system to administer its new
law. This is how the Connecticut court handled the issue, although the court also found
that the union violated the strong public policy of the state.94 A court in New York might
conclude that although the policy favors same-sex unions for many purposes, its family
law court is not set up to process the dissolution of these unions.
The other issue concerns the substantive law that applies to the dissolution
proceeding. In a typical dissolution proceeding, the state that hears the dissolution
applies its own law to the proceeding. If the court has the jurisdictional authority to
adjudicate the case, it follows that it has the authority to apply its own substantive law to
the dissolution proceeding.95 This is the tradition in divorce jurisprudence followed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams I and Williams II, two famous cases from divorce
law jurisprudence.96
Given the unique nature of the civil union, it is also possible that a court would accept
jurisdiction of the dissolution proceeding but choose to apply the dissolution law of
Vermont to the substantive issues presented.
Another way to view the arrangement is as a contract rather than a marriage. The
parties might claim that the terms, though identical to a marriage contract in Vermont
including an obligation to pay support and to provide for other marriage-like benefits, in
fact create a contract rather than a marriage. A marriage is a contract sanctioned by the
state and entered into by the parties to the marriage.
94
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Even if a state court is unwilling to sanction the same-sex union as a marriage, the
court may nevertheless be willing to recognize the validity of the contract that has been
created between the two parties. The contracting party John wants the terms of his civil
contract in Vermont honored in New York. Those terms include a term that requires the
couple to dissolve the civil union before entering another one. They also agreed to
dissolve the union in the same way that marriage is dissolved in Vermont. If the New
York court considers this a contract dispute, it may enforce the contract like it would any
other contract between unmarried cohabitants.97 If New York courts enforce contracts
between unmarried gay and lesbian couples, a court would likely enforce the terms of this
couple’s contract as it would any other couple’s contract. The fact that the contract is
tantamount to marriage in Vermont does not detract from the agreement’s inherent
contractual character.

2. Enforcement of a foreign judgment from Vermont
PROBLEM:
Assume in this problem that instead of John moving to New York after the parties
separated, but before their union was dissolved, he moved to New York after a court
in Vermont dissolved their union. The court ordered support paid by John to Joseph
of $1000 per month. John leaves, moves to New York, and falls behind in his
payments. Joseph seeks to enforce the judgments for past due support in a New York
court. Will the New York court enforce the judgments against John?
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Once the Vermont union has been dissolved by a Vermont court and the support
obligation has been reduced to final judgment, it will be more difficult for a sister-state’s
court to refuse to enforce the judgment on the basis of the judgment violating a public
policy of that state. Enforcement of judgments across state lines is the obligation of a
sister state pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Sister states have enacted
uniform legislation, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,98 to harness this
enforcement power among the states. The language in the Act speaks of an obligee as
“an individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a
support order has been issued or a judgment determining parentage has been rendered.”99
The Act does not restrict its jurisdiction to married couples or to same-sex couples
although the family law in many states makes that distinction. But in the context of this
case, the court in New York will be bound to follow the substantive law of Vermont.
Since Vermont recognizes the obligation to pay support for same-sex couples, the court
should enforce the support order under the uniform law regardless of the substantive law
of Vermont.
Arguably, the Defense of Marriage Act provides an exception for issues regarding
enforcement of same-sex marriages across state lines, but these are issues of Full Faith
and Credit rather than of conflict of laws. The questions include whether DOMA applies
to a civil union, not a marriage, and to enforcement of a money judgment against a party
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who it has already been determined owes the money to the other party.100 Issues
regarding the constitutionality of the Act’s restriction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
also remain to be determined. Assuming that DOMA is constitutional, it appears that a
state could refuse to enforce a support order entered against a party in a same-sex union.
Another argument against enforcement could be raised in this context: if a state has
enacted a mini-DOMA law stating that its public policy is against enforcement of samesex marriage, that local law presents a conflict with the law of Vermont in this context.
A number of jurisdictions have enacted laws stating that “marriage is a contract that may
be entered into only between a man and a woman.”101
Whether or not enforcement of the out-of-state support order presents a conflict
involves an interpretation of the state statute. The statute specifically addresses marriage
as a contract between a male and a female; the Vermont Civil Union law is different in
that it involves a contract that is regarded as different from marriage. Maybe there is no
conflict if one interprets that law in that way.
On the other hand, the Vermont law creates all the same rights and responsibilities of
marriage in the civil union. Even though we don’t call a civil union a marriage, it is for
all practical purposes very much like a marriage. A state court might view the miniDOMA statute as being in conflict with the state uniform enforcement of support law.
Given state interests, it might construe the mini-DOMA law as stating public policy that
prevents the court from enforcing a support order from a Vermont civil union. The
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counter argument is that the uniform law makes it clear that once an out-of-state support
order is presented for enforcement in a responding court, the court does not have
discretion to change the terms of the support order or to modify it in any way.102 If the
issuing tribunal has jurisdiction of the matter and has entered a support order, there
should be no discretion on the part of the responding court concerning the enforcement of
the order. In that respect, it would seem that the responding state’s public policy
objections to same-sex unions are irrelevant to the proceeding.

2a. Enforcement of a foreign judgment brought by a third party
PROBLEM
Assume a different problem involving enforcement of a judgment across state lines.
Assume that when the parties divorced, the Vermont court ordered that John be
responsible for consumer debt incurred by the parties during their union. As a part of
the dissolution order, John is ordered to pay several thousands of dollars of debt.
John has moved to New York, and has not repaid the consumer debt. The retail
establishment gets a judgment against John and moves to enforce the judgment in
New York. Will the New York court enforce the judgment against John for
repayment of the consumer debt?
This case presents some of the same issues presented in the previous problem about
enforcement of out-of-state judgments. The same analysis mentioned above applies to
the analysis of this problem.
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As a matter of Full Faith and Credit, and under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, the enforcement may be required by one state court of another’s
judgment against a debtor now residing in another state.103 The Uniform Act streamlines
a requirement that states enforce sister-state judgments as required by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.104 The Act implements the requirement of the Constitution; with or
without the Act, the states have no choice but to enforce sister-state judgments in their
state courts.105
The creditor seeking enforcement relied on Vermont law in obtaining a judgment
against the debtor. When the court issued the judgment, the judgment creditor was
entitled to rely on the effectiveness of that judgment and was entitled to enforce that
judgment in another state.106 If the creditor cannot do that, its debtor may be able to
avoid the effectiveness of the judgment by traveling out of Vermont. That does not seem
to be a desirable result nor is it consistent with the constitutional and uniform law
relevant to this issue.
When a creditor seeks the enforcement on a debt judgment in a proceeding in a sister
state, a sister-state’s court may not refuse to enforce the judgment against the debtor even
if the basis for the debt is contrary to the public policy of the sister state. For instance, if
a debt incurred through gambling is created in Nevada, reduced to judgment in Nevada,
and enforcement is sought in Alabama, Alabama courts must enforce the judgment even
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though gambling is against the public policy and law of the state.107 Therefore, even if
the court in New York had a strong public policy against recognition of same-sex unions,
that public policy should not be raised in the context of an enforcement of foreign
judgments proceeding. The public policy issue is moot because it cannot be raised when
the judgment has already been determined against the debtor.
In our case involving the judgment debtor of the creditor who is relying on Vermont
law to collect a judgment against the debtor now living in New York, New York should
enforce the judgment as it would any other judgment. The conflict-of-law issue is not
relevant because the public policy of the two states’ laws are not at issue in this context;
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Uniform Enforcement of Judgments Act require
one state to enforce judgments from another state.
Imagine that the judgment creditor seeks enforcement of the judgment in a
jurisdiction that has enacted a mini-DOMA law that declares state policy to be against
recognition of same-sex marriage. If the court is not free to consider the public policy
issues in the context of an enforcement action in that state’s court, the statute should have
no relevance to the proceeding. The court would be required to enforce the action
regardless of express state policy against same-sex relationships.
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2b. Enforcement of a foreign state custody order
PROBLEM:
Assume that John and Joseph adopted two children during their civil union. At the
dissolution of the union, the Vermont court ordered that Joseph be the primary
custodial parent for the two children. John is given visitation rights that include an
every-other-weekend visit along with regular visits during the week. John is also
given a six-week visit time in the summers. John has now moved out of state, and
during one summer visit in New York, he refuses to return the children to Joseph’s
home in Vermont. If Joseph seeks enforcement of the Vermont court custody decree
in New York, how will the New York court respond?
Enforcement of foreign custody orders are governed by the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
uniform laws designed to provide consistency in child custody decisions from state to
state. Once a state court determines that it has jurisdiction over the determination of
custody, enforcement issues are to be determined by that state court unless that state loses
jurisdiction over the custody dispute.108
Given that a Vermont court makes a custody decision when the civil union is
dissolved that gives custody of the child to one of the partners, the New York court is
obligated to give effect to the Vermont decree. By giving that decree effect, the court is
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recognizing the legitimacy of the union made in Vermont, and it is also recognizing the
authority of the Vermont court to adjudicate custody between the civil union partners.
The command of the law makes it very difficult for the state court to ignore the order
entered in Vermont that determined the custody at the end of the civil union. By
following the law, the court is tangentially recognizing the civil union and legal
recognition given to same-sex partnerships in Vermont. And the court has little choice in
the matter.109
Once a state has enacted law that recognizes marital rights for same-sex partners, the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and the Uniform Family Support Enforcement Act
mandate enforcement of rights stemming from that recognition in other states. To that
extent, a state cannot avoid the impact of another state’s liberalization of its marriage law
to include same-sex couples.

3. Recognition of same-sex union in the context of a wrongful death action
PROBLEM:
Assume a different fact situation. Doris and Denise reside in Vermont and enter into
a civil union in Vermont. Several years later, they move to Oregon and reside in
Oregon for several years before Doris is killed in Oregon in an automobile accident.
Denise brings a wrongful death action in an Oregon court against the driver who
killed her partner. Is it likely that the Oregon court will determine that Denise has
standing to bring the wrongful death action?
This fact pattern is different from the previous ones in that the status of the parties’ is
not the main issue before the court but is incidental to the main issue. In this case, the

definition of the parties’ relationship will impact whether or not Denise can be considered
a spouse for purposes of the wrongful death statute.110 Courts may be more flexible in
these kinds of cases.111 One commentator has observed that, “Marriage has many
incidents beyond licit sexual congress—a spousal share of the marital estate upon the
death of a spouse, pension rights, health and insurance benefits, to mention a few.
Adjudication of these incidents may raise the necessity of resolving the validity of the
marriage and, in turn, triggers the application vel non of the public policy exception. So
long as the adjudication of the incident does not compel the court to bless an odious
union, public policy will not be a bar.112
If the state has no statutory law that addresses this question, the court will be faced
again with an examination of the policy interests of the state and whether recognition of
the marriage does violence to those interests. The court may look at it differently than if
the court were asked to recognize the status of the parties. The parties are no longer
living in a civil union; one of the parties has died. One of the parties is asking the court
to treat her as a spouse and allow her to be in the position that she and her partner
intended. She has been living in a relationship in which she may have derived her
support from her partner; now that her partner is gone, she is in need of support. The
wrongful death statute is intended to provide that kind of support.
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The purpose for the lawsuit may make it easier for the court to construe the public policy
in a direction that allows for inclusion of the partner as a spouse. The relationship has
ended and the court can focus on the policy of the wrongful death statute. In Langan v.
St. Vincent’s Hospital, the court concluded that the wrongful death statute should be
construed broadly to include as a spouse a surviving partner from a Vermont civil union.
In doing so, the court considered the policy of the law in New York as favorable to samesex unions, and from that, decided it is reasonable to expand the definition of spouse.113
Although the purpose behind the wrongful death statute is to compensate the
surviving partner, not to recognize the status of the partnership as a marriage, a court may
nevertheless find that the policy of the state is not supportive of including a same-sex
partner within the protection of the wrongful death statute. The state may have a specific
statute that makes recognition squarely against state law, or it may be clear that the
“degree of moral opprobrium is strong because of the presence of abhorrent conduct.”114

4. Inheritance rights of a same-sex partner
PROBLEM:
Assume the same facts as above except that Doris dies of natural causes and leaves a
large estate. Doris had not written a will. Denise petitions the court in Oregon to be
named as a spouse entitled to inherit her estate. Will the Oregon court recognize
Denise as a spouse?
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The same public policy issues must be resolved as were presented by the wrongful
death case. Again, the court is not being asked to recognize the civil union, but to allow
Denise to recover as though she was a spouse of her partner who died intestate.
In deciding whether or not to allow Denise standing to recover, one must first identify
the conflict between the law of Vermont and that of Oregon. In Vermont, Denise is
considered to have the same rights as a spouse at her partner’s death.115 In Oregon, the
partner does not qualify as a spouse or surviving relative, and would not be entitled to an
intestate portion of the estate.116
In order to determine whether or not Denise qualifies as a taker of the intestate estate,
a court must first resolve the conflict in the law of the two states. The case of In Re
May’s Estate117 and the case of In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate118 are good examples of
how this conflicts issue might be resolved. The second case, Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate,
involves a man who at the time of his death in California, was legally married to two
women, both of whom lived in India. Both wives petitioned the court to share the estate
of the deceased and the court held that it would not violate the public policy of California
to allow both wives to be treated as intestate heirs and to share in the decedent’s estate.
The court said: “The decision of the trial court was influenced by the rule of ‘public
policy’; but that rule, it would seem, would apply only if the decedent had attempted to
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cohabit with his two wives in California. Where only the question119 of descent of
property is involved, ‘public’ is not affected.…’ ‘Public policy’ would not be affected by
dividing the money equally between the two wives, particularly since there is no contest
between them and they are the only interested parties.” And so the court proceeded to
divide the funds equally between the two surviving spouses.
As a matter of conflict of laws, the court accepted the marriage law of India to the
extent that the law accepted the practice of having two wives to inherit property at the
death of the husband. The court said that both wives fit into the definition of wife in the
intestate statute and the court construed the statute to allow for the inclusion of two
wives.
In resolving the conflict in the laws of the two states in this case, there are similar
public policy issues at stake as were at stake in the California case. Even though
Oregon’s law and public policy does not support same-sex unions as marriages or as civil
unions, the court is not being called upon to sanction the relationship. Rather, the court is
being asked to recognize at death the right of the partner who has depended on the
decedent for support to receive support out of the decedent’s estate. The issue at stake
does not require the court to sanction or to accept the same-sex partnership as being
equivalent to marriage; it calls on the court to recognize the need the surviving partner
has for support and nothing more.
If the same-sex partner prevails in this case, the consequences are that the court
accepts the civil union law of Vermont, but construes the language in the Oregon
intestate succession law to define spouse as including “same-sex” partner. The court
would have to be willing to broadly construe the terms of the statute. Since the parties
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are Oregon domiciliaries and have made Oregon their home, Oregon’s law is applicable
to the determination of the rights of a surviving partner. (Had the parties been in Oregon
for a short time, or had the parties continued to reside in Vermont, but had been visiting
in Oregon, Vermont’s law would seem to be the applicable law for determining intestate
succession rights.)
To convince a court to do that, one would have to focus on the purpose of the
intestate laws. The Oregon intestate succession law provides that the surviving spouse of
a decedent inherits all of the decedent’s estate unless the decedent leaves issue that are
not issue of the surviving spouse.120 The purpose of the intestate law is to provide for the
passing of the decedent’s estate when the decedent did not provide for division of the
estate in a will. Studies have found that most married people want their estates to pass to
their spouses.121 Because the closest surviving person in this case is Denise, the domestic
partner, it seems clear that the decedent wants the property to pass to her partner Denise.
Although it is apparent that the domestic partner desired her property to pass to her
partner, whether the court would construe the statute in this way is difficult to say.
Another way to reach this result is to change the statute to include domestic partners
within the class of those who can inherit from the decedent.122
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5. Surviving same-sex partner and spouse
PROBLEM:
Sue and Sarah entered into a civil union in Vermont. Several years later, Sarah left
Vermont to live in Connecticut. While living in Connecticut, Sarah met Adam and
fell in love with him. Adam and Sarah were married in Connecticut. Shortly after
their marriage, Sarah was killed in an automobile accident. When Adam brings a
wrongful death action in a Connecticut court, Sue intervenes and asks the court to
name her as the surviving spouse for purposes of the wrongful death action. What is
the court likely to do?
In addition to the other issues raised, this problem raises the issue of how a court will
handle the simultaneous marriage and civil union of a decedent who dies leaving both
parties as surviving partners.
The Vermont Civil Union Law provides in Section 1202 that, “For a civil union to be
established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the parties to a civil union satisfy all of
the following criteria: 1) Not be a party to another civil union or a marriage.”123 Once
Sarah and Sue registered their civil union in Vermont, they fell under Vermont law
requiring that their union be dissolved before another union or marriage can be created.
Had Sue filed a wrongful death claim in Vermont, the court would honor that claim as it
is clear in the law that the wrongful death action is available to Sue to pursue and
Vermont would not recognize a later marriage entered into in Connecticut before the civil
union was dissolved.
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Connecticut may view these issues differently. If Connecticut recognizes the out-ofstate civil union, it may also recognize the restriction in the law that regards the civil
union as a monogamous relationship that must be dissolved before another union or a
marriage can replace it. On the other hand, if Connecticut does not recognize the union,
the court will not recognize the restriction in the law. The only valid union is the
marriage entered into with Adam. Adam will be entitled to make the claim under the
wrongful death statute.
If Connecticut does not recognize the civil union entered into in Vermont, it is
possible that both Sue and Adam could proceed with wrongful death actions in Vermont
and Connecticut. Either or both states could process their action as if the other state did
not have the authority its law gives it to adjudicate the wrongful death actions. That
result would not work efficiently since there is a finite sum available for the wrongful
death action and it should be distributed fairly to those who qualify for the recovery.
One approach might be to treat either partner as though that partner is a putative
spouse and entitled to a share of the spouse’s share of the wrongful death claim. The
putative spouse doctrine is designed to protect the interests of an innocent spouse who
believes that he or she is legally married to another, but it later turns out, that the
marriage is not valid.124 This doctrine may not work well in the context of a case like this
if either of the partners knows of the other partner and knows that partner has a legal
relationship with his or her partner. If a state does not accept the validity of the
relationship created by the Vermont civil union law, it is unlikely to follow the putativespouse doctrine to protect the interests of that partner.
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If Vermont is the forum that considers the wrongful death claim, it may also balk at
applying a doctrine that dilutes the effectiveness of its own law, but the doctrine is
designed to provide protection to an innocent spouse who doesn’t know of the existence
of another spouse or someone who is entitled to a share of the deceased spouse’s estate.
It might be consistent with Vermont’s public policy to provide this kind of protection to a
partner, no matter what the gender of the partner.

6. Limiting a partner’s ability to marry during civil union
PROBLEM:
Assume the same facts as above, except that when Sue learned that Sarah planned to
marry Adam, she filed a lawsuit in Connecticut seeking to enjoin the county from
issuing a marriage license to Sarah and Adam since Sarah is in a civil union with Sue
that has not been terminated. Is the court in Connecticut likely to enjoin issuance of a
marriage license?
In assessing the likelihood that a Connecticut court would enjoin a county from
issuing a marriage license, the question is one of whether the court accepts the Vermont
law that makes it necessary to dissolve the civil contract before entering into a marriage.
The policy interests mentioned earlier in the context of the other problems apply here, but
there are other issues to consider as well. If Connecticut takes the position that the
marriage can go forward without dissolution of the Vermont civil union, it is sanctioning
a relationship that will not be recognized in Vermont. The two states will recognize one
relationship, but not the other. This situation undermines the record keeping and

credibility of state-sanctioned relationships. Not only are the two parties affected, but
also the state and those who may rely on state records may be affected.
Assume that a creditor in Connecticut relies on the fact that Sarah is married to Adam
and loans the couple money to purchase a home based on the incomes of both of them.
Subsequent to that time, a creditor from Vermont seeks to levy on property that Sarah
owns. During their civil union, Sue and Sarah incurred the debt. Even though the
couple no longer lives together, they have not dissolved their civil union and both are
responsible for the debt’s repayment.
To the extent that a state’s failure to recognize the Vermont civil union law impacts
the rights of third parties, it threatens to undermine the reliance that creditors and others
may have on state marriage laws.

7. Effect of civil union on a registered partnership
PROBLEM:
Assume that when Sarah left Sue, she moved to California where she met Sherri.
Sherri and Sarah plan to enter into a registered domestic partnership in California.
When Sue finds out about their plan, she files an action in California to enjoin the
county from issuing the registration. What is the California court likely to do in that
case?
California has adopted a domestic partnership registration law. This law falls short of
the protection offered by Vermont’s civil union law, but the domestic partnership law

provides some of the protection that marriage provides to those living in a same-sex
partnership.125
There are significant differences in the laws of the two jurisdictions because Vermont
intends its civil union to be as much like marriage as it can even though the civil union is
not officially considered a marriage. California’s law is not intended to create a
marriage; the domestic partnership law offers different protection to the parties. Both
laws do share the requirement that a person entering into either a civil union or a
domestic partnership must not be either married or in another civil union or domestic
partnership.126
In resolving the conflict in the laws of Vermont and California, the issue is how will
California regard the civil union. It is not a marriage, and it is not a domestic partnership,
but it is more like marriage than a domestic partnership. Although California has enacted
the domestic partnership law, it has also enacted law that makes it clear that California
regards marriage as a relationship that is one between a man and a woman.127 If a
California court recognizes the Vermont civil union and enters an order enjoining the
county from registering the domestic partnership in California, is it recognizing an outof-state marriage between a same-sex couple? Since Vermont law is clear that the civil
union is not a marriage, a California court could recognize the out-of-state civil union,
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and at the same time avoid a conflict with the California law that makes clear what
California policy is on same-sex marriage.
Another way to look at this issue is to consider what the court would do if it were
faced with a California domestic partnership that had not been terminated and now one of
the partners was seeking to enter into another partnership before terminating the previous
partnership. The California law is clear on this point; a partnership may not be entered
into when a partner is already in a domestic partnership that has not yet been terminated.
If the California court did not treat the Vermont civil union in the same way that it treated
a party who is in a domestic partnership, an argument could be made that the out-of-state
partner is being treated differently than the same-sex partnership created in California.
The difference in treatment may be very difficult to justify.
California has recently passed a law entitled The California Domestic Partner Rights
and Responsibilities Act that extends the rights and responsibilities of marriage to
persons registered as domestic partners on or after January 1, 2005.128 The new law
provides that, “(A) legal union of two persons of the same sex, other than a marriage,
that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is substantially equivalent to a
domestic partnership as defined in this part, shall be recognized as a valid domestic
partnership in this state, regardless of whether it bears the name domestic partnership.”129
This provision specifically gives recognition to same-sex partnerships created and
sanctioned in another jurisdiction. The provision stops short of recognition of same-sex
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marriages, and given the statute that defines marriage as a heterosexual union, it is clear
that the law is designed to stop short of recognizing foreign same-sex marriages.

Part III: International Conflicts involving Recognition of Same-Sex Unions
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, several countries have recently legalized
same-sex marriage. Canada, The Netherlands and Belgium have changed their laws to
permit same-sex marriage. In these countries the law now includes same-sex couples
within the marriage statute, so they have been given the same ability to marry as
heterosexual couples.
In The Netherlands, there is a restriction in the law regarding who may marry. The
right to marry for same-sex couples is restricted to couples that are citizens or residents.
Other Northern European countries that provide for registration and a civil-union type of
recognition also restrict the availability of the laws to their own citizens and residents.
Reciprocal recognition is likely in other countries with similar laws.130
Canada’s approach to marriage and recognition issues is apparently quite different.
Canada’s law does not have a residency requirement; it can be expected that numbers of
people from outside of Canada will go to Canada to marry.131 The fact that Canada’s law
has no residency requirement for marriage creates the likelihood that a number of people
from the United States will travel to Canada to marry and then return to the United States
to live in a marital relationship. The other part of this scenario is that a number of
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Canadians will marry in Canada and then travel to the U.S. and expect to have their
marriages honored in the United States.
The issue of acceptance of the foreign marriages presents very similar issues to those
that we have already discussed in the context of interstate conflicts involving state
marriage laws. American courts will consider them in the same way that they will
consider the issues involving interstate conflicts. In the very few court cases involving
foreign polygamous marriages, we can see that courts were willing to accept the validity
of the unions to provide benefits and protection to the spouses. Recognition of the status
of the parties as being married is a different issue the courts have not addressed. Courts
would probably be much less likely to recognize the status of the relationship when it is
apparent that the marriage is repugnant to the public policy of a state.
In other words, our state courts will analyze the problems of recognition of a foreign
marriage very similarly to the way these problems have been analyzed for interstate
conflicts. Americans who travel to Canada to marry can expect to find the same issues
awaiting them on their return to the United States. Canadians can expect to encounter
those same issues to the extent they seek to litigate issues regarding the validity of their
marriages in American courts.
For Europeans and Americans who marry or enter into a same-sex union in Europe
and seek recognition of that union in the U.S., it is likely to be even more difficult. Most
of the European countries that have enacted same-sex marriage or registered partnerships
have restricted who can qualify for marriage and have also limited the effect of the
partnerships outside the home jurisdiction. For instance, the Netherlands law states that
at least one of the parties must be domiciled or a permanent resident in order to qualify

for marriage.132 The Parliament made the benefit unavailable to parties who are
domiciled in other countries. In part, this may be because the Parliament realized that
few other countries will recognize the marriage, so it made it available only to people
who will likely be living in the Netherlands. The parliamentary committee recognized
that there would be a problem of recognition of gay marriages in other countries,
“something the future spouses of the same sex will have to take into account… However,
this problem of ‘limping legal relations’ also exists for registered partners, as well as for
cohabiting same-sex partners who have not contracted a registered partnership or
marriage.”133
To some extent this problem of recognition is less significant in Europe than in the
United States because European law regarding the validity of marriage begins from a
different point: the capacity to marry is determined not by the law of the place of
celebration, but rather by the “personal law of the parties, the law of the parties’ domicile
or nationality.”134 In Europe, citizens do not expect to be able to travel to other countries
and marry under law that is different from their national law.
The issue of marriage validity for foreign domiciliaries going to a country that
accepts same-sex marriage in order to marry under the law of that state will arise less
often because the legal culture in Europe accepts that domiciliaries must marry according
to the law of the state where they reside. They may not avoid that law by going to a
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different country to marry under that country’s more lenient laws. In the rare case where
it does happen, a country in Europe will examine its public policy to decide whether or
not to recognize the marriage made in a different country.135
But issues of validity of Canadian marriages between Americans and between
Canadians who move to the United States are certain to arise. The culture in Canada is
more like the culture in the United States in that the new law does not include a residency
requirement for marrying. In all likelihood, many Americans will journey to Canada to
take advantage of this new law.
When they return to the United States to live, the same issues that have been raised in
the context of interstate marriage-law conflicts will come up in the context of this
international conflict. And when Canadians who married under the Canadian law move
to the United States after marrying in Canada, recognition issues will arise when they
wish to divorce, when a partner dies, etc.
These issues raise the same problems that are raised by the interstate conflicts cases
that we have discussed previously. But since they are cases that arise from out of the
country, they don’t trigger application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For example,
although sister-state judgments are entitled to full faith and credit throughout this
country, foreign judgments are not entitled to the same recognition across international
lines.136 Nevertheless, foreign judgments will usually be recognized and enforced unless
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the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the
State where enforcement is sought.137 One can imagine that a state court might take the
position that enforcement of a dissolution judgment for a same-sex couple is repugnant to
its fundamental notions of what is decent and just, and the court would balk at enforcing
the judgment.
When the issue is one of recognition of a foreign marriage that would not be
recognized in the United States, the issue is one of recognition and enforcement of
foreign law that makes marriage legal between two people of the same sex. Reasoning
through the conflicts resolution issues are no different than reasoning through those
issues when the court is faced with an interstate conflict.138 A state court will consider
the same issues it considers when faced with an interstate conflict.
In summary, the conflicts issues will likely be resolved similarly in the international
context as they are in the interstate context.

Part IV. Conclusion
Marriage law is evolving. Part of that evolution involves acceptance of same-sex
couples into the institution. At this point, same-sex marriage has been accepted in two
western European countries and in Canada. In Vermont and in Western Europe the
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which a sister State judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit.” (Citation omitted.)
137
Id. at § 117, comment c, p. 340. The comment states: “Judgments rendered in foreign nations are not
entitled to the protection of full faith and credit. A State of the United States is therefore free to refuse
enforcement to such a judgment on the ground that the original claim on which the judgment is based is
contrary to its public policy. A judgment rendered in a foreign nation, however, will, if valid, usually be
given the same effect as a sister State judgment. (Citation omitted.) The fact that suit on the original claim
could not have been maintained in a State of the United States does not mean that a judgment rendered on
the claim in a foreign nation will necessarily be refused enforcement by the courts of that State. In fact,
enforcement will usually be accorded the judgment except in situations where the original claim is
repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the state where enforcement is sought.”
138
Id. at ch. 1, § 10, p. 39.

concept of an enduring same-sex relation has been sanctioned in civil partnership laws
that offer most, if not all, of the protection of marriage. It remains to be seen how
Massachusetts will fashion its legally recognized equivalent to marriage for same-sex
partners. In other American and western European countries, same-sex partners are
protected by laws that give the partners many of the rights of marriage.
As this change in family law develops, conflicts between the laws of states and
countries undoubtedly will occur.
Interstate conflicts will be resolved following the principles of the Full Faith & Credit
Clause. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and other state law will also be important
in deciding the interstate conflicts issues. Many states have enacted mini DOMAs that
make it clear that state courts are prohibited from recognizing out-of-state same-sex
marriages. A liberal interpretation of these laws may also limit recognition of same-sex
partnership laws.
For those states that have not adopted law that restricts recognition of out-of-state
same-sex unions, it remains to be seen how these states will resolve the conflicts of law.
How a state resolves this issue depends in great measure on the state’s public policy
regarding same-sex unions. If the state considers such unions repugnant to its public
policy, the state will not recognize the marriages or civil unions. If the public policy is
accepting of same-sex unions, it is more likely that the state will recognize the unions.
A relevant factor in making this determination is what kind of issue is presented
regarding the same-sex union. If one of the partners is asking the court to adjudicate a
divorce, the court may answer the question differently than if one of the partners is
seeking to recover under a wrongful death statute. The dissolution case forces the court

to confront the validity of the same-sex marriage head-on while the validity of the
marriage is a collateral issue in the wrongful death or intestate succession cases. In the
latter cases, a court will be more likely to give recognition to the same-sex union than
when it must consider the validity of the marriage as the primary issue.
For those cases that involve conflicts of law across international boundaries, the same
principals of recognition and resolution apply. Though United States state courts are not
bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the resolution of the international conflicts
cases is likely to be similar to the resolution of the interstate cases.
As courts are called on to face these conflicts issues, the existence of the marriages
and unions will push the courts in the direction of recognition of out-of-state unions valid
where entered into. The reason is that the fabric of our society depends upon the family;
where the law of a jurisdiction has sanctioned the creation of a family and that family has
lived together for a number of years, the family expects that its relationships will be
honored by those called upon to consider issues related to its existence. The expectation
of the parties and the need for a law that allows for the creation of predictable and stable
relationships will move us in the direction of recognition. Once the door is opened a
crack by the sanctioning of the same-sex relationships in some jurisdictions, it signals a
broader acceptance of the relationships.
There is no doubt that the door has opened at least a crack and it is very likely that in
the next several years we will see many issues involving the conflicts between state laws
litigated in state courts.

